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The nature of pleasure and its role in human psychology and ethics attracted 
many early Greek philosophers such as Prodicus and Democritus, and then 
engaged almost all of the best minds of the Platonic Academy, sparking a series 
of intense intra-school debates. In these debates Aristotle’s understanding of 
pleasure has a particularly noteworthy and extraordinary status. In contrast to 
Plato, subsequent Platonists, and the early Greek tradition as a whole, which 
associate pleasure with a restorative process, the satisfaction of desire, or the 
quality of our positive affect,2 Aristotle offers an energeia-based definition of 
pleasure, which connects pleasure with the exercise (energeia) of our natural 
faculty in its good condition, a goal-immanent and self-realized activity.
There are, however, two distinct treatments of pleasure in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, each of which seems to describe the way in which pleasure is con-
nected with energeia differently. While according to Book VII, pleasure is 
the unimpeded activity of the natural state (ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, 
EN VII.12.1153a14), in Book X Aristotle maintains the following:
Pleasure completes the activity. But the way in which pleasure com-
pletes the activity is not the way in which the perceptible object and 
the perceptual capacity complete it when they are both excellent—just 
1   I would like to thank audiences at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and Columbia 
University. For the comments on earlier drafts, I am indebted to Philip van der Eijk, David 
Merry, Tianqin Ge, Oliver Overwien, and Elizabeth Asmis. I owe special thanks to William 
Harris for his invaluable proof-reading, advice, and critical remarks. Finally, I am grateful for 
the support of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung (van der Eijk’s research programme: 
‘Medicine of the Mind, Philosophy of the Body—Discourses of Health and Well-Being in the 
Ancient World) that supported me to accomplish my research in Berlin.
2   Here I follow the traditional interpretation of Plato’s concept of pleasure, cf. Frede 1997; van 
Riel 2000: 7–43; Evans 2008; Carpenter 2011. For its reception in later medical tradition, in 
particular in Galen, see Boudon-Millot in this volume.
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as health and the doctor are not the cause of being healthy in the same 
way. Pleasure completes the activity not in the same way the state does 
by being present [in the activity], but as a sort of supervenient end, like 
maturity on the prime of life.
EN 1174b24–26, b31–333
The account of pleasure in EN X seems to differ from that in EN VII in one 
substantial respect, inasmuch as the latter identifies pleasure with a particular 
activity while the former implies that pleasure and activity are distinct via 
some sort of supervenience relation (ἐπιγινόμενον).4 Many scholars believe 
that these two accounts in principle are incompatible.5 Moreover, although 
the majority of scholars are inclined to hold that EN X offers a philosophically 
more promising account of pleasure, what persists is widespread disagreement 
about how to understand the so-called supervenience of pleasure on activity.
In contemporary Aristotelian scholarship we can roughly divide the inter-
pretations of supervenience into two groups. Let us call one the Extrinsic 
Reading and the other the Intrinsic Reading. The former treats pleasure as an 
epiphenomenon or a by-product6—something that is generated by an activity, 
but does not exert reciprocal influence on the activity in question.7 Inwood, 
for instance, claims that ‘in the Nicomachean Ethics pleasure is not consti-
tutive of the activity which is happiness, but reliably accompanies it. What 
3   τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἥ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ 
ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. […] 
τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς 
ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. The translation is based on Irwin, but modified. With respect to the sense of 
the simile—οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα, I follow Hadreas 1997. For a more detailed discussion, see 
Cheng 2015, 332–3. For a recent defence of the traditional reading ‘like the bloom on youths,’ 
see Warren 2016.
4   Following the custom of Aristotelian scholarship, I use supervenience and its cognates to 
refer to the particular relationship between pleasure and activity (energeia), which can be 
traced back to the Latin translation of ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος (EN X 4.1174b33) as ‘superveniens 
quidam finis’ by Robert Grosseteste (cf. Hadreas 1997, 372). Although it is an open question 
how to specify this relation in Aristotle (cf. Vogt in this volume), certainly it cannot be con-
fused with the term ‘supervenience’ which is commonly used to characterize a particular 
dependence of mind on body in contemporary philosophy of mind (cf. Kim 1991). For a dis-
cussion of supervenience in Aristotle’s philosophy of mind, see Caston 1993.
5   Alexander, PE 143.13–146.12; Festugière 1936; Dirlmeier 1964, 567, 580–1; Lieberg 1958, 7–15; 
Ricken 1976, 115–17; Gosling and Taylor 1982, 250–4; Wolf 2002, 191, 205; Irwin 2007, 169, n35; 
Rapp 2009, 222; Heinaman 2011; Shields 2011; Salim 2012; Harte 2014.
6   For the ancient concept of epiphenomenalism see Caston 1997; for this concept in contem-
porary philosophy see Robinson 2015.
7   Van Riel 1999; 2000, 43–78.
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motivates us is the drive to activity in accordance with our characteristic ratio-
nal excellence’.8 The Intrinsic Reading, on the contrary, understands pleasure 
as the perfection of the activity upon which it supervenes. As such, pleasure 
is constitutive of, and intrinsic to, the activity with which it is connected. 
Proponents of this reading, however, are not unanimous about how to specify 
the way in which pleasure makes the activity perfect. Does pleasure function 
as a final cause,9 a formal cause,10 the passive dimension of an activity,11 or the 
overall interplay of all excellent aspects?12 While the Extrinsic Reading justifies 
the priority of activity over pleasure by appealing to the ontological depen-
dence of pleasure on activity, which allows for the completeness or perfectness 
of the activity in question as well as a fixed hierarchy between pleasure and 
activity, the Intrinsic Reading highlights the constitutive role of pleasure by 
emphasizing its particular contribution to the perfection of activity.
The dispute between these two readings is still in progress, and perhaps 
will not end. In what follows, however, I do not want to broach this point 
of contention directly. Instead, I aim to draw attention to a similar, yet basi-
cally ignored debate in antiquity over the obscure relation of supervenience 
between pleasure and activity in which both Alexander of Aphrodisias and 
other interpreters of Aristotle, probably his colleagues, students, and even some 
of his predecessors, took part.13 This exegetic debate is hidden in Alexander’s 
8    Inwood 2014, 40.
9    Cf. Gauthier and Jolif 1958–9 (vol. II.2), 839–42.
10   Gosling and Taylor 1982, 241–54. Taylor (2008, 263) has changed his mind, admitting that 
his early suggestion of pleasure as a formal cause is ‘less plausible’. Shields (2011, 207–8) 
suggests that pleasure is first of all an efficient cause, but that it is also a formal and final 
cause.
11   Salim 2012.
12   Strohl 2011. Strictly speaking, Strohl’s position stands somewhere between the Intrinsic 
and Extrinsic Reading. For he denies that pleasure can function as any of Aristotle’s four 
causes, and qualifies it as a perfect aspect of a well-operative activity. Pleasure is intrinsic 
to the activity only insofar as it is an ingredient of the excellence of the activity. The excel-
lence of activity X, however, seems to be extrinsic to X inasmuch as it is added to form X 
rather than being an integral part of form X. As the contrast drawn between the minimal 
condition and the perfection of X shows, Strohl understands the form of something as 
the bottom line of what this thing is, a set of basic features shared by all the individuals 
subordinated to this universal. Yet it is doubtful whether this understanding would be 
well received by Aristotle, who might be more inclined to take the form of something as 
an excellent realization of its intrinsic power in a teleological context.
13   This hypothesis does not necessarily commit us to believe that the debates in question 
happened between Alexander and his opponents in an established institution (as the 
hedonistic debates among the Academics in the Academy), because (due to the fact that 
there is no information about any of his immediate pupils) whether and in what sense 
Alexander had a school is still an open question (cf. Sharples 1990b). Rather, I simply want 
174-200_Harris_10-Cheng.indd   176 7/9/2018   5:37:20 PM
177Alexander of Aphrodisias on Pleasure and Pain in Aristotle 
theoretical criticism of some anonymous ‘hedonists’ in the Problemata 
Ethica—a collection of short and unsystematic notes about ethical issues.14 
I shall argue that Alexander develops his anti-hedonistic argument mainly 
based on the Extrinsic Reading of Aristotle’s supervenience-based interpre-
tation of pleasure, whereas the ‘hedonists’ criticized by him are those who 
advocate a pleasure-friendly and an Intrinsic Reading of the supervenience in 
question, or those who try to verify the goodness of pleasure by appealing to 
Aristotle in this way. In light of this dialogic situation, many of Alexander’s 
argumentative moves are presumably reactions to, and influenced by, the 
proposal of his opponents who base their theories likewise on a reading of 
Aristotle.
The reconstruction of this forgotten debate within the Peripatetic tradition 
is of significance in three respects. First, it provides us a new way to understand 
Alexander’s particular motivation and arguments in his account of Aristotle’s 
pleasure, and in particular several extraordinary features of his interpretation. 
For instance, it is unusual that Alexander, unlike most Aristotelian scholars, 
expends so much effort on the clarification and classification of different 
kinds of pain. Arguably, one motivation for him to flesh out the conception 
and evaluation of pain is that his anti-hedonistic concern in determining the 
nature of pleasure—which is presumably initiated by some pleasure-friendly 
interpretations of Aristotle’s theory—leads to a correspondingly friendlier 
attitude to pain, an opposite of pleasure in his account. This understanding 
of pain is, however, in tension with the negative evaluation of pain dominant 
in Aristotle.15 Second, since there are only a few incomplete commentaries on 
Aristotle’s Ethics surviving from antiquity,16 a reconstruction of this debate 
to argue that the main target at which Alexander aimed was the Aristotelian tradition. For 
my detailed discussion, see below.
14   For discussions of this collection, see Madigan 1987; Sharples 1990a. The collection edited 
by M. Bonelli: Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia (Questioni etiche e Mantissa): Metodo e 
oggetto dell’etica peripatetica (Naples, 2015) awaits further examination given that it was 
published after I finished the main part of my manuscript. As a remedy, I have added a 
few footnotes to reflect some of the discussions that arose in that volume, in particular 
the contributions of L. Castelli and C. Natali.
15   Cf. Top. 119a39–b1; EE 1225a16; 1227a 40; EN 1113b1–2; 1385b13–14; Rhet. 1386a7–9.
16   That is the commentary of Aspasius—who is supposed to have lived in the first half of 
the second century AD—on EN I–IV and on a larger part of EN VII–VIII (in CAG 19.1 
ed. by Heylbut). For discussions of this commentary, see Moraux 1984, 226–93; Barnes 
1999. A surviving anonymous commentary on EN II–V (CAG 20,122–255, ed. by G. Heylbut) 
is sometimes believed to have been written later than Aspasius but before Alexander’s 
works (the last quarter of the second century AD according to Moraux 1984, 325; Mercken 
1990, 408; or about the late 170s according to Eliasson 2013, 200). The author of this text 
is taken by Kenny (1978, 37) to be Adrastus of Aphrodisias, a Peripatetic active in the 
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will provide a valuable slice of the history of the reception of Aristotle’s prac-
tical philosophy in the ancient commentary tradition, which was overshad-
owed by extensive works on Aristotle’s theoretical philosophy. In particular, 
it offers us a typical example of the dominant way of doing philosophy from 
the first century BC onwards, which connects the solution of problems with 
textual exegesis.17 In other words, by virtue of this instance we can see how 
ancient commentators approach ethics in terms of Aristotelian exegesis, and 
conversely, how their textual interpretations are deeply influenced by the pre-
supposed philosophical positions.18 Finally, as indicated above, the ancient 
debate between Alexander and other Aristotelians actually foreshadowed the 
divergence in modern disputes on Aristotle’s theory of pleasure. The parallel 
not only reflects the tension and potential of Aristotle’s account itself, but also 
urges us to reconsider the hermeneutic situation with which we are now faced. 
If we are not to fall into the stalemate which beset the ancients, Aristotle’s 
notion of supervenience needs to be approached by an alternative proposal 
which overcomes the opposition between the Intrinsic and Extrinsic Readings.
The structure of my article is the following: to begin with, I show how 
Alexander interprets Aristotle’s doctrines about pleasure, and how his inter-
pretation of these doctrines leads to a particular understanding of pain. After 
that, I argue that Alexander uses his interpretation of Aristotle to serve his own 
anti-hedonistic purposes. The hedonism he was most worried about here, how-
ever, is neither a vulgar hedonism nor Epicureanism but a pleasure-friendly 
trend within the Peripatetic tradition, which interprets Aristotle’s doctrines of 
pleasure in such a way as to pave the way for a Peripatetic variety of hedo-
nism. Finally, I shall briefly review the merits and disadvantages of Alexander’ 
approach.
2 Defining Pleasure
Alexander’s discussions of Aristotelian pleasure and pain are chiefly preserved 
in the so-called Problemata Ethica, a collection of short treatises probably 
second century AD, yet it is more likely a compilation that in part depends on Adrastus’ 
work On Historical and Literary Questions in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (cf. 
Moraux 1984: 323–9, Mercken 1990, 421–2; also see Barnes 1999, 15–18). For a rehabilitation 
of its philosophical relevance see Eliasson 2013.
17   E.g. Gottschalk 1987; Sedley 1997.
18   Natali (2015) has recently offered an excellent summary of how Alexander interprets 
Aristotle’s concepts of pleasure and pain by appealing to the principle of Aristoteles ex 
Aristotele, and to what extent his interpretation is indebted to Aspasius. Nevertheless, the 
philosophical implication of Alexander’s approach is not adequately explored.
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based on his lecture notes, as its subtitle—‘school-discussion problems and so-
lutions on ethics’19—indicates.20 Although PE is formally structured, like other 
works in the genre of problemata literature,21 by ‘question(s) and answer(s)’ 
or by ‘thesis and analysis’, it is easy to discern that almost all the problems 
treated here arise from a reading of Aristotle’s EN, and so the treatises express 
a strong interest in textual interpretation. The selection of topics in the collec-
tion, however, is centered around the pair ἡδονή and ἀρετή, while neglecting 
many significant subjects in Aristotle’s Ethics—which shows the influence of 
Hellenistic and later philosophical taste.22
In accordance with the contemporary mainstream interpretation, Alexander 
sees no substantial divergence between the two accounts of pleasure in EN VII 
and X,23 but the cornerstone of his understanding of pleasure is EN X,24 
according to which pleasure is something that supervenes on a perfect activity 
(energeia) and completes it.25 Alexander paraphrases the thought as follows:
19   σχολικῶν ἠθικῶν ἀποριῶν καὶ λύσεων κεφάλαια.
20   We have no compelling reason to deprive Alexander of the authorship of this text, see 
Sharples 1990b, 1–7.
21   For this genre see Pfeiffer 1968: 69–70; Oikonomopoulou 2013; Taub 2015.
22   The logical and dialectical interests of this text have been correctly highlighted by 
Sharples (1990a) and Castelli (2015). However, it seems to me exaggerated to claim that 
in this collection, Alexander’s ‘interest lies primarily in the theoretical or logical issues 
rather than in their ethical content as such’ (Castelli 2015: 42). It is undeniable that 
Alexander here is interested in relations of contrariety, predication, and genus/species, 
and addresses them more frequently than Aristotle did in his ethics, yet this does not 
mean that ‘the domain of ethical concepts becomes a privileged domain for testing 
and developing formal distinctions’ (Castelli ibid.). In this study I aim to show that with 
respects to pleasure and pain, Alexander’s approach and his strategy are essentially moti-
vated by ethical interest and serve ethical proposes, so that many of his arguments cannot 
be properly understood without his ethical concerns.
23   Cf. Alexander in APr. 302. 5–6, 8–10; in Top. 164. 16–17. A central concern of Problem §23 (If 
pleasure is unimpeded activity of a natural state according to Aristotle, how will happi-
ness too not be pleasure? <Πῶς εἰ <ἡ> ἡδονή ἐστι κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ φύσιν 
ἕξεως ἀνεμπόδιστος, οὐκ ἔσται καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ’ αὐτὸν ἡδονή. 143.10) is how to reconcile 
the apparent inconsistence of two different understandings of pleasure in EN VII and X, 
cf. PE 143. 25–144. 4. Alexander points out that pleasure is regarded as activity because 
it always supervenes on activity. This answer suggests that he takes the definition in the 
EN VII as incautious yet compatible with EN X.
24   Pace Natali (2015, 79), according to whom EN VII plays a more important role in 
Alexander’s interpretation.
25   Cf. EN. 1174b23; 31–33; 1175a15, 21, 29–30; 35–36; 1175b30–35. In speaking of the dependence 
of pleasure on activity, Alexander interchangeably uses ἐπιγίγνεσθαι, γίγνεσθαι plus ἐπί, or 
only the preposition ἐπί. No matter whether Alexander provides a plausible interpreta-
tion of Aristotle, I maintain the term ‘supervenience’ in order to show that Alexander’s 
discussions are substantially based on Aristotle’s view in EN X.
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Pleasure follows activities and is in a way a part or an end of them, and 
it is from them that it has its [worthiness] to be chosen or avoided; for 
the [pleasures] that [supervene] on activities that are to be chosen are 
[themselves] to be chosen, and those that [supervene] on those that are 
not like this are to be avoided.
PE 127.11–1326
Readers who are familiar with Aristotle might expect Alexander to specify 
the supervenience relation between pleasure and activity (energeia). He does 
not, however, attempt to do this, but seems happy to loosely use different 
words—following (hepomenē), somehow a part (meros), and an end (telos)—
to describe this relation at the outset. More surprisingly, he never returns to the 
whole-part or the process-end relation indicated at the beginning of this pas-
sage, but uses the supervenience relation to underline the overall dependence 
of pleasure on activity. This indicates that Alexander is not so much concerned 
to clarify the exact nature of the puzzling supervenience, but to justify the 
ontological priority of activity over pleasure—not only in this passage, but also 
in this whole collection—by appealing to such a relation. As a result, we can-
not recover Alexander’s view, if he had one, on how Aristotle thought plea-
sure played the role of perfection-maker. Alexander’s basic idea can be roughly 
understood as follows:
Given that x supervenes upon y, any character of x is determined by a cor-
responding character of y, but not conversely.
In this model, as we have indicated, Alexander’s purpose is to foreground the 
ontological and causal priority of activity over pleasure. As a result, pleasure 
turns out to be epiphenomenal insofar as the reciprocal contribution of plea-
sure to the activity with which it is connected is deliberately dismissed. On the 
basis of this ontological relation, Alexander establishes a corresponding value 
supervenience, to which he attaches the most weight. According to this, given 
that a pleasure supervenes on an activity, the pleasure will have the same value 
as the activity. The pleasure’s value is determined by the activity’s, but not 
vice versa.27
26   ἡ ἡδονὴ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ἑπομένη καὶ μέρος πως ἢ τέλος οὖσα αὐτῶν παρ’ ἐκείνων ἔχει τὸ αἱρετόν 
τε καὶ φευκτόν (αἱρεταὶ μὲν γὰρ αἱ ἐπὶ ταῖς αἱρεταῖς ἐνεργείαις, φευκταὶ δ’ αἱ ἐπὶ ταῖς μὴ τοιαύ-
ταις. Trans. by Sharples (1990a), modified.
27   PE. 120.11–16; 120.24–31;124.9–11; 18–21; 133.20–23; 134.12–14; 137.1–5; 137.25–27;137.33–36; 
146.1–7.
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This relation explains why some pleasures are good and others bad, by mak-
ing their value dependent on the value of the activities they depend on. For 
according to this model, since activities can be good, bad, or neutral, the same 
goes with their associated pleasures.28 It is therefore obvious that neither plea-
sure as a whole, nor pleasure in the absence of qualifying expression can be 
qualified as the good or something good.29 This conclusion is lucidly expressed 
by the title of Problem §5 that ‘if pleasure in general is a genus, it seems 
neither a good nor an evil nor something intermediate’.30 As a consequence, it 
is categorically illegitimate to attribute any evaluative property to pleasure if 
pleasure is not determined by a quantifying expression.
It is remarkable that Alexander keeps silent about the fact that the activity 
in question is characterized by Aristotle as perfect or excellent (EN 1174b16–20). 
That is, according to Aristotle, pleasure is not simply causally determined by a 
random activity, but seems to be supervenient upon the activity as long as it is 
somehow functioning well. Pleasure does not only concur with a good activ-
ity, but also shares the same or at least similar characteristics of this activity. 
It is noteworthy that this extraordinary understanding of pleasure is put for-
ward and gradually fleshed out in a dialectical context in which Aristotle takes 
issue with his opponents, in particular, the Academics, who define pleasure 
as a kinēsis or something like kinēsis, which is essentially imperfect accord-
ing to Aristotle’s conceptual schema. Thus, the concept of energeia should be 
adequately understood in reference to kinēsis, and their relation is the key for 
Aristotle in his attempt to defend the value of pleasure. Alexander, however, 
diluted the dialectical background in Aristotle’s account,31 and left the signifi-
cant opposition between kinēsis and energeia unmentioned. In doing so, he 
underplayed (if not completely dismissed) Aristotle’s normative motivations 
in making pleasure supervene on the perfect activity, so that he can ignore 
Aristotle’s emphasis on pleasure as the perfection of the activity. A dramatic 
contrast between the ways in which Aristotle and Alexander utilize the super-
venience is that whereas this relation is initially invoked by Aristotle to verify 
the value of pleasure, Alexander is mainly concerned to resist hedonism in 
28   EN 1175a22, 27–28; 1175b1; 1175b36; cf. Alexander PE §3, § 13, § 17; §19.
29   For discussion about the distinction between the propositions with quantifying expres-
sion and those without it in Aristotle, see Malink 2015, 273–285.
30   ἡ κοινὴ ἡδονὴ ἡ ὡς γένος λαμβανομένη οὔτ’ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν οὔτε κακὸν οὔτ’ ἀδιάφορον, PE 124.1–2.
31   This aspect is properly emphasized by Natali (2015, 67 and 80). Yet he seems to go too far 
in claiming that Alexander’s approach is thus scientific rather than dialectical (‘un’ indag-
ine scientifica e non dialettica’ (2015, 67).
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appealing to the same concept of supervenience, which, then, also leads him 
to an extraordinary understanding of pain.32
It is well known that there is no systematic account of pain available in 
Aristotle’s extant corpus. But sometimes he seems to presuppose that pain is 
a kind of mirror image of pleasure, so that its nature can be inferred from 
the nature of pleasure. This procedure can be called the ‘mirroring method’,33 
which also plays a significant role in Alexander’s struggle to evaluate pain: ‘for 
[pleasure] comes about by its affinity to them (sc. energeiai), like a sort of end 
for them; but pain34 is a sign of alienation from the [activities] on which it 
supervenes’ (PE 124.29–31).35 As in his discussion of pleasure, Alexander does 
32   It is extraordinary in the sense that pain, in parallel with pleasure, is understood by a 
particular supervenience relation between the affect and an energeia (for my more 
detailed discussion, see below). Ancient mainstream views on pain, however, were domi-
nated by medical thought, in particular, the Hippocratic tradition, according to which 
pain amounts to some kind of imbalanced state of the body caused by unnatural and 
violent change (Scullin 2012, also cf. Harris and Boudon-Millot in this volume).
  Pace Castelli (2015, 42), who seems to suggest that Alexander’s interest in the rela-
tions between the pairs pleasure/pain and good/bad is determined by his interest in the 
oppositions of contrariety. I think, on the contrary, that Alexander here addresses these 
pairs, not because they can be used to illustrate the relations of contraries, but because, in 
order to offer a proper evaluation of pleasure and pain, he feels it is necessary to struggle 
with problems concerning different kinds of contraries.
33   The name is owed to Frede (2006, 263).
34   Sharples 1990a consistently translates λύπη as distress and πόνος as pain in this collection, 
which seems to suggest that Alexander more or less follows the Stoic theory of emotion. 
Although Alexander is doubtless influenced by Stoics in this regard, this choice, how-
ever, does not work well for the whole collection for three reasons. First, a main target of 
Alexander’s engagement with pain is to interpret Aristotle. Aristotle does not use λύπη 
as exclusively emotional, but every kind of pain as well as pain in general or the con-
cept of pain per se. If we follow Sharples, the exegetic feature of Alexander would be 
obscured. Second, two main concerns of Alexander’s handling of this topic are to explain 
(1) which kind of pain is opposed to pleasure (ἡδονή), (2) in what sense pain is opposed 
to pleasure. He does not distinguish between χαρά and ἡδονή in a Stoic way, but is more 
concerned about the relationship between pleasure and pain as such. Hence even if 
he draws the distinction between λύπη and πόνος in a Stoic way, his motivation is still 
to solve problems around pain. Finally, and most importantly, Alexander does not have 
a unified distinction between λύπη and πόνος. In PE 126.7–11, he seems to provide a 
Stoicism-like distinction between λύπη and πόνος by referring the former to a contrac-
tion of the soul (ψυχικὴν συστολήν), and the latter to some affliction (θλῖψιν) of the body. 
Nevertheless, in PE 125.32–35, λύπη becomes the general concept of pain, whereas πόνος 
counts as its part. This relation, however, is discussed in PE 127.8–10, in which πόνος is 
taken to be wider than λύπη.
35   κατ’ οἰκειότητα γὰρ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὰς ἐγίνετο καὶ ὡς τέλος τι ἦν αὐτῶν, ἡ δὲ λύπη ἀλλοτριότητός 
ἐστι σημεῖον τοῖς ἐφ’ οἷς γίνεται. Trans. by Sharples (1990a), modified.
174-200_Harris_10-Cheng.indd   182 7/9/2018   5:37:20 PM
183Alexander of Aphrodisias on Pleasure and Pain in Aristotle 
not elaborate on the supervenience of pain, but aims to establish a reversed 
supervenience of value on this basis:
Similarly it is reasonable to suppose that pains, too, supervening on 
certain activities, themselves derive from these their worthiness to be 
chosen or avoided, in the opposite way to the pleasures. For those that 
supervene on noble activities are to be avoided, those that [supervene] 
on shameful [activities] are to be chosen.
PE 127.13–1736
As we can see from this passage, the crucial step for Alexander towards re-
constructing an Aristotelian understanding of pain is that pain, in analogy to 
pleasure, is equally determined as something that supervenes upon energeia. 
This is by no means a self-evident move, not only because, intuitively, several 
kinds of pain—for instance, a headache—do not seem to presuppose that 
I am using my brain,37 but also because Aristotle does not explicitly state that 
the supervenience between pleasure and energeia can be transferred into pain 
and energeia.38
Alexander seem to be aware of these problems. By appealing to the distinc-
tion between voluntary, involuntary, and non-voluntary actions in EN III.2, 
he tries to find concrete examples in Aristotle which show that pain not only 
supervenes upon energeia, but also does so in an opposite way to the superve-
nience of pleasure. For according to Aristotle, if someone’s bad activity caused 
by ignorance is afterwards accompanied by pain and regret, this action should 
be assessed as better than the same action without pain. Pain, then, functions 
36   οὕτως εὔλογον καὶ τὰς λύπας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἐπὶ ἐνεργείαις τισὶ γινομένας παρ’ ἐκείνων καὶ αὐτὰς 
ἔχειν τὸ αἱρετόν τε καὶ φευκτὸν ἔμπαλιν τῶν ἡδονῶν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ ταῖς καλαῖς γινομένας 
ἐνεργείαις φευκτὰς εἶναι, τὰς δ’ ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσχραῖς αἱρετάς. Trans. by Sharples (1990a), modified.
37   Pain of this kind seems to be well explained by ancient medical tradition (cf. Harris 
and Boudon-Millot in this volume). I leave open whether the same goes with pleasure. 
Aristotle at least believes that all kinds of pleasure required corresponding activities, but 
he does not explicitly apply the same thought to pain.
38   Usually Aristotle either takes pain as a hindrance of an on-going energeia (cf. EN 1153b3) 
or some sort of unnatural change (cf. Resp. 479b26–30; Metaph. 1022b15–21). In DA 
III.7.431a9–11, however, he seems to classify pain, in parallel with pleasure, under the cat-
egory of energeia. ‘Whenever there is something pleasant or painful, it [the soul] by, so to 
speak, affirming or denying, pursues or avoids. And it is the case that being pleased and 
being pained are the actualizations (τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν) of the mean of 
the perceptual faculty in relation to what is good or bad insofar as they are such’ (trans. 
Shields 2016). For a detailed discussion about the sense in which pain can be regarded as 
an energeia, cf. Cheng 2015, 364–371.
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as a meta-evaluative criterion in distinguishing between involuntary and non-
voluntary activities (cf. EN 1110b19–24; 1111a19–21). Leaving aside whether what 
Aristotle is saying here instantiates the supervenience in question, if this case 
represents the supervenience Alexander is focusing on, it would undermine 
his determination of pleasure and pain as epiphenomena, because the pain 
seems to be impacting the evaluation of the action rather than the other 
way round. Whether Alexander is aware of this problem or not, what is more 
important for him is to find a concrete example in Aristotle which can evidence 
the reversed supervenience of pain, extrapolated via the mirroring method 
mentioned above. This relation, contrasted to the label of the supervenience 
of pleasure as affinity (oikeiotēs) (PE 124.29–36),39 is called by Alexander an 
‘alienation’ (allotriotēs), according to which pains which accompany good 
activities are bad, pains which accompany bad activities are good, and pains 
which accompany indifferent activities (epi tais adiaphorois) are indifferent 
(124.24–26). Based on the notion of pain as an alien supervenience, Alexander 
establishes a converse value-supervenience of pain, which can be summarized 
as follows:
Given that a pain supervenes on an activity, the pain will have the oppo-
site value as the activity. The pain’s value is determined by the activity’s, 
but not vice versa.
It is remarkable that, just as in the case of pleasure, Alexander does not elabo-
rate how pain supervenes upon activity in an alien way. He is more concerned 
to establish a systematic evaluation of pain by means of such alien super-
venience, which functions perfectly as a counterpart of the supervenience 
relation between pleasure and activity. Although Aristotle also touches upon 
alienation, he does not determine pain as an alien supervenience, but only men-
tions that pleasure derived from activity x would become painful for someone 
who is doing y if x is alien to y (cf. EN X.5.1175b1–24). No matter whether and 
39   The Stoic terms are striking here (cf. Sharples 1990a, 27 n.55). Cf. Chrysippus fr.229a: οὐ 
μὴν ἀκολουθεῖ γε ταῦτα τοῖς Χρυσίππου δόγμασιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῷ μηδεμίαν οἰκείωσιν εἶναι 
φύσει πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἢ ἀλλοτρίωσιν πρὸς πόνον. On the Stoic Oikeiosislehre, see Pembroke 1971, 
112–49; Engberg-Pedersen 1990; Bees 2004; Forschner 2008. Although it is intricate and 
controversial how the Oikeiosislehre of the Stoics is related to the Peripathetic tradition (cf. 
Brink 1956, Szaif 2012, 229–63), it is certain that some early Peripatetics (e.g. Theophrastus, 
Dicaearchus) propounded some Peripatetic versions of oikeiōsis, which, though impacted 
by Stoics to varying degrees, can also be somehow traced back to Aristotle’s own teaching, 
cf. EN 1153a20–22; 1175a34–36; 1175b22–23; 1175b16–17; 1175b30–31; 1178a5.
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to what extent Alexander does justice to Aristotle, his approaches have signifi-
cant consequences.
First, hedonism is false, not because pleasure is bad, but because pleasure 
and pain cannot provide any non-derived reason or value for actions and 
choices. Second, even though they relate to activity in opposite ways, pleasure 
and pain are similar in that pleasures and pains as a whole are essentially inde-
terminate with respect to their evaluation.40 In other words, neither of them is 
more prone to be good or to be bad. Pleasure as a whole is thus no better than 
pain as a whole. Third, a broad space is created for the evaluation of pain. This 
fits well with the Peripatetic preference of proper emotions in which certain 
kinds of pleasure and pain are blended, yet it is in tension with Aristotle’s use 
in several arguments of the premise that pain is something bad.41 The solution 
of this aporia thus becomes a main task in Alexander’s treatment of the nature 
of pain.42
3 Alexander and the Aristotelian Forms of Hedonism
Alexander addresses the supervenience relation between pleasure and activity 
as part of a case against hedonism. Aristotle, in contrast, develops the theory 
of pleasure as standing in a supervenience relation to activity as part of a 
dialectical defense of the value of pleasure. Prima facie it appears unclear why 
Alexander, in contrast to Aristotle, is so worried about hedonism. It is rea-
sonable to assume that this feature reflects a widespread hostility towards 
Epicureanism, which had been a commonplace since the Hellenistic period. 
Under closer scrutiny, however, Alexander seems to have had a different con-
cern. For what he strives to do is not simply to refute hedonism from a theo-
retical point of view, but also to ‘purify’ Aristotle’s theory of even the slightest 
hedonistic hint.
40   Note that the thesis that the value of x is indeterminate is not equivalent to the thesis that 
the value of x is intermediate between good and evil. Rather, it is another way to formu-
late the thought in Pr. §5 that pleasure as a genus seems ‘neither a good nor an evil nor 
something intermediate’ (PE 124. 1–2).
41   EE 1225a16; 1227a 40; EN 1113b1–2; Rhet. 1385b13–14; 1386a7–9; Top. 119a39–b1.
42   Pace Natali (2015), who believes that Alexander’s main concern in the PE is to verify the 
thesis that every pain is a bad, yet not every pleasure is a good. This characterization is 
too simplistic: it fails to pay due attention to the richness and complexity of Alexander’s 
engagement, in particular his struggle with the problem concerning classification and 
evaluation of pain in terms of the supervenience.
174-200_Harris_10-Cheng.indd   185 7/9/2018   5:37:21 PM
186 Cheng
Like other opponents of Alexander in the PE, the friends of pleasure also 
remain anonymous in his account. It is worth looking at how Alexander char-
acterizes the hedonists in question:
They (sc. the hedonists) are vulgar either because they locate happiness 
in bodily enjoyments, as do also slaves and cattle, <or> because, accord-
ing to those, pleasure alone is to be chosen and pain is to be avoided on 
its own account.
PE 138.8–1043
In this passage, the hedonists in question are divided into two groups: those 
who ‘locate happiness in bodily enjoyment’ and those who take pleasure and 
pain as the things to be chosen or avoided for their own sake. The former seems 
to represent a folk hedonism, according to which bodily pleasure is the ultimate 
good. The position of the latter, in contrast, alludes to a theoretical interest on 
the estimation of pleasure and pain in activities. It is thus not astonishing that 
the second group is Alexander’s main target in his struggle against hedonism. 
In another passage, he reports their position in more detail:
For [someone might] say both [1] that only pleasures are to be chosen on 
their own account, and that each of the other things that are to be chosen 
[deserves to be chosen] to the extent that it contributes something to 
pleasure, and also [2] that, while what is noble is to be chosen because it 
produces pleasure, what is shameful is not also to be chosen because of 
the pleasure brought about by it.
PE 145.21–2544
In this outline of hedonism, we can discern few special Epicurean features. 
For it is not exclusively Epicurean to think that pleasure is worth choosing on 
its own account. There is little reason on this basis alone to suppose that the 
Epicureans were the unique target in Alexander’s polemic. We should note that 
the pleasure-friendly tradition was so influential that it is by no means limited 
to Epicureanism, but was popular in ordinary thinking, and was even endorsed, 
43   Ἢ διότι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐν ταῖς σωματικαῖς ἀπολαύσεσι τίθενται, ἐν αἷς καὶ τὰ ἀνδράποδα καὶ τὰ 
βοσκήματα, εἰσὶ φορτικοί, <ἢ> διότι καθ’ οὓς ἡ μόνη ἡδονὴ αἱρετὴ καὶ ὁ πόνος δι’ αὑτὸν φευκτός. 
Trans. by Sharples (1990a), modified.
44   τὸ γὰρ ὁμοῦ μὲν λέγειν τὰς ἡδονὰς μόνας εἶναι δι’ αὑτὰς αἱρετάς, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων αἱρετῶν ἕκαστον 
ἐφ’ ὅσον εἰς ἡδονήν τι συντελεῖ, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τὸ αἱρετὸν ἔχειν, ὁμοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν καλὸν αἱρετὸν 
εἶναι λέγειν ὡς ποιητικὸν ἡδονῆς, μηκέτι δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν φάσκειν αἱρετὸν γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν 
γινομένην ἡδονὴν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ. Trans. by Sharples (1990a), modified.
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to varying degrees, by several philosophers in other traditions, including Stoics 
and Peripatetics, who are supposed to have held a serious attitude towards 
pleasure.45 This fact opens up the need to reconsider the complexity of the he-
donistic tradition and their argumentative strategies,46 which becomes more 
urgent if we take a look at Alexander’s further account of his opponents:
[This person might indeed] say that the pleasures that supervene on 
noble activities are pure and free from mixture with the opposite pains, 
and that on this account the activities that produce them, too, are to be 
chosen; while those [pleasures] that [supervene] on shameful [activities] 
possess little that gives enjoyment and much and more that produces 
pains, for which reason such activities too are not to be chosen, being 
productive of pain rather than of pleasure.
PE 145.28–3347
It is striking at first glance that Aristotelian jargon and thought can be found 
in this report, which suggests that Alexander’s opponents seem also to be in-
terpreting Aristotle or philosophizing within an Aristotelian framework.48 To 
put it more precisely, they follow Aristotle at least on four points. (1) They 
understand pleasure as something that supervenes upon activity. (2) They 
believe that pleasure resembles the activity it accompanies. Concretely speak-
ing, good pleasure always supervenes on good activity, whereas pleasure that 
accompanies bad activity is shameful, mixed with pains, and thus undesirable. 
45   For the traditional image of Stoics as typical anti-hedonists see Vogt elsewhere in this 
volume. In the intra-school debate, however, Poseidonius and Panaetius are believed to 
argue against the pleasure-hostile trend of the Stoic tradition by their attempts to defend 
the value of pleasure, and to incorporate it into the life according to nature (Pohlenz 1940, 
6–7). The friends of pleasure among the Peripatetics include Lyco and many others. For 
my detailed discussion, see below.
46   For a systematic overview of ancient anti-hedonistic arguments, see Vogt in this volume.
47   τὸ γὰρ λέγειν τὰς μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς καλαῖς ἐνεργείαις γινομένας ἡδονὰς εἰλικρινεῖς τε εἶναι καὶ 
ἀμίκτους ταῖς ἐναντίαις λύπαις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰς ποιητικὰς αὐτῶν ἐνεργείας ἔχειν τὸ 
αἱρετόν, τὰς δ’ ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσχραῖς ὀλίγον ἐχούσας τὸ τέρπον πολλὰ ἔχειν καὶ πλείω τὰ λυποῦντα, 
διὸ μηδὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας εἶναι τὰς τοιαύτας αἱρετὰς οὔσας ποιητικὰς λύπης μᾶλλον ἢ ἡδονῆς, trans. 
by Sharples (1990a), modified.
48   With respect to the syncretic tendency of different philosophical schools from the 
Hellenistic time onward, it is of course possible that Alexander engages the view of his 
opponents in his own (i.e. Aristotelian) terms, so that the Aristotelian features of the he-
donists in his report might stem from Alexander himself. It is, however, unlikely in our 
case, because, as I shall show, the resemblances between the hedonists and Aristotle’s 
account of pleasure are so systematic that it cannot be explained only in terms of the 
contamination in terminology.
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(3) The pleasure that originates from perfect activity is described by them as 
pure and removed from mixture with pain, which seems to correspond to 
Aristotle’s concept of pleasure without qualification (haplōs). (4) They not 
only oppose pleasure to pain, but also hold that bad pleasure would give rise 
to a corresponding pain. This kind of pleasure seems to belong to pleasure per 
accidens according to Aristotle.49 So far, Alexander’s opponents appear very 
Aristotelian.50
Why was Alexander so annoyed by this doctrine that he thought it nec-
essary to refute it? The central anxiety of Alexander is that these people are 
confused about the hierarchy of pleasure and activity, because according to 
the theory quoted above, Alexander complains, pleasure would not be worth 
choosing because of activity, but activity would be valuable because of plea-
sure. This critique appears a bit odd, since these hedonists seem to agree with 
Alexander that pleasure and pain supervene upon activities and thus their 
natures are somehow determined by the activities accompanied by them. For 
this reason, they do not necessarily belong among the hedonists who believe 
that only pleasure offers the ultimate or the non-derived reason for motivations 
and actions. The disparity between Alexander and his opponents is rather that 
the latter have in mind a different kind of supervenience between pleasure 
and activity, or that they interpret the Aristotelian supervenience in a different 
way. Alexander believes that the goodness of pleasure is determined by the 
goodness of activity, yet he does not think that a good activity must entail plea-
sure, nor that the concurrent pleasure constitutes the goodness of the activity. 
According to the ‘hedonists,’ on the contrary, the activity upon which pleasure 
supervenes ought to be good in a certain sense. Pleasure is not only causally 
effective, but also constitutes the value of the activity to which it is connected. 
Accordingly, Alexander holds that it is possible for pain to supervene upon any 
kind of activity, whereas the ‘hedonists’ seem to think that pain only super-
venes upon incomplete or bad activities. Presumably they would justify this 
view by insisting that it is incoherent to claim that pain can supervene upon a 
perfect activity, because the coexistence of pain must have harmed the activity 
accompanied and thus undermined its perfection.
If we recall Aristotle’s theory of pleasure in EN X—that pleasure is some-
thing that supervenes upon an activity and makes it perfect—it is clear that 
49   About Aristotle’s distinction between pleasure without qualification and per accidens, see 
EN 1152b27–31; 1153b2 ἁπλῶς ἣ τῷ πῇ; 1152b8–9: οὔτε καθ’ αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός, also 
cf. 1153a29–30, 1154b15–20.
50   Sharples’ conjecture (1990a, 45–6, n.142) that they are ‘right-thinking people in general, to 
which some Aristotelians could belong. His suggestion seems to me too broad to grasp the 
character of these hedonists.
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Alexander takes the asymmetrical relation entailed in the supervenience as 
the central lesson of Aristotle’s definition of pleasure, whereas for the ‘hedo-
nists’ what is more significant is the role of pleasure as a perfection-maker of a 
perfect activity. Since the theory of the ‘hedonists’ operates within Aristotelian 
philosophy, it is plausible to assume that the ‘hedonists’ criticized by Alexander 
are first of all those who stand for another line of interpreting Aristotle’s the-
ory of pleasure, or at least those who attempt to defend a pleasure-friendly 
position in an Aristotelian way. We should not forget that in contemporary 
Aristotle scholarship there are those who frankly acknowledge the close 
relation between Aristotle and the hedonistic traditions in later generations.51 
It is of course possible that a similar reading of Aristotle emerged preced-
ing and contemporary to Alexander. In this sense, as anticipated above, the 
debate between Alexander and the ‘hedonists’ not only concerns the problem 
of whether hedonism is theoretically tenable, but is motivated by the ques-
tion of which reading is a more authentic interpretation of Aristotle. This result 
fits well with the general character of the PE, which exhibits strong interest in 
textual exegesis.
Our hypothesis is in accordance with Sharples’ general characterization of 
Alexander’s approach—‘Alexander’s discussions of pleasure, a major concern 
of the Ethical Problems, are concerned with problems raised by Aristotelian 
doctrine rather than with specifically anti-Epicurean polemic’52—and it 
can also gain support from a broader historical point of view. Intra-school de-
bates were not unusual within Greek philosophical schools, perhaps in particular 
among Peripatetics.53 Hahm, for instance, has shown how Critolaus (c. 200– 
c. 118 BC) argues against the technicity of rhetoric in favor of the relevance 
of philosophy to political education, whereas his younger colleague, Aristo 
of Cos, conversely insists that rhetoric is a science by appealing both to 
Aristotle and the Academics.54 In tune with this tendency, Alexander also has 
no qualms about criticizing his Peripatetic predecessors such as Andronicus 
(cf. In APr. 161. 1), Sotion (cf. In Top. 434. 2), and Xenarchus (cf. Mantissa 
151. 3–11, Simplicius in Cael. 21. 33),55 although he does not always refer to the 
critical targets by name.56
51   E.g., Merlan 1960; Hardie 1968, 295; Rorty 1974, 482; Van Riel 2000, 46; Wolfsdorf 2009.
52   Sharples 1990b, 95.
53   Cf. Sedley 1989, 99.
54   Hahm 2007, 54–60.
55   For Alexander’s relations to his predecessors, see Sharples 1990b, 89–90.
56   In Mantissa 106.20–23, for instance, Alexander argues against a literal interpretation of 
the potential intellect as matter without mentioning Xenarchus, the Aristotelian who is 
supposed to hold this view (cf. Falcon 2012: 135–138). Sharples (1990b: 88) also assumes 
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It is especially telling that there was a divergence between pleasure-friendly 
and pleasure-hostile trends within the Peripatetic school prior to Alexander. 
Lyco of Troas (c. 299–c. 225 BC), who was the head of the school after Strato 
c. 269 BC for more than forty years, is representative of the former attitude, 
because he defines eudaimonia as true pleasure (chara) of the soul accompany-
ing the noble (epi tois kalois, fr. 10 Wehrli).57 By contrast, Critolaus of Phaselis, 
who famously rejects the idea that pleasure can be constitutive for the goal of 
activities and degrades it as something bad (fr. 23 Wehrli), belongs to the latter 
group.58 The parting of ways among the Peripatetics happened not only for 
theoretical reasons, but was also probably motivated by issues in the exege-
sis of Aristotle.59 Stephen White has convincingly argued that Lyco’s theory 
comes into dialogue with Stoicism and Epicureanism,60 whereas Inwood adds, 
with good reason, that what Lyco represents is presumably ‘a more hedonistic 
interpretation of Aristotelian ethics.’61 Remarkably, the phrase epi tois kalois is 
resonant with the frequent occurrence of the same phrase in Alexander,62 in 
particular his use of the preposition ‘epi’ as a shorthand to refer to the superve-
nience relation in Aristotle’s theory of pleasure.63 It is not impossible that Lyco 
that in PE §11, Alexander might adopt Aspasius’ discussion of the involuntary and vol-
untary actions (Apasius 59. 2–11), and that it contains a critical reply to Adrastus if the 
anoymous commentary uses Adrastus’ materials on this topic. In any case, Aspasius and 
Adrastus are not mentioned here.
57   Cf. White 2004, 389–94.
58   For discussions of Critolaus’ ethics in historical context, see White 1992, 86–90; Russell 
2010, 160–71; Hahm 2007, 62–81; Szaif 2012, 156–67, 184–86.
59   Even if the interpretation of Aristotle did not take pride of place among the earlier 
Peripatetics as it had done since Antiochus or since the publication of Andronicus’ edi-
tion, we cannot exclude it from the activities of the Hellenistic Peripatetics (cf. Lefebvre 
2016, 28–30). Barnes (1997) has shown that the stories around the revival of Aristotle due 
to the rediscovery of his ‘esoteric works’ are more or less exaggerated. For a recent discus-
sion about the reception of Aristotle’s ethics in the Hellenistic period, see Nielsen 2015.
60   White 2002, 76–9.
61   Inwood 2014, 39. Although Inwood correctly, in my view, highlights the exegetical con-
text of Lyco’s hedonism, I suspect that he goes astray in regarding Lyco’s position as ‘an 
attempt to unify Aristotle’s two accounts of pleasure and its relationship to happiness’ 
(Inwood 2014, 41). This claim presupposes, indeed as Inwood himself believes, that the 
accounts in EN VII and X are actually incompatible, and that the former is advantageous 
for hedonism, whereas the latter is anti-hedonistic. As Aspasius, Alexander, and many 
others show, that ancient critics usually do not take the two accounts as contradictory 
in this way. The Aristotelian hedonists recorded by Alexander are not exceptional. We 
unambiguously see them freely using EN X to support their hedonism rather than exclu-
sively insisting on EN VII.
62   Cf. PE 146.1; 152.21.
63   E.g., PE 126.1, 127.12–13, 137.3–4, 137.7–9, 152.20–23.
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interprets the Aristotelian supervenience relation as if true pleasure is some-
thing that is so closely connected with the noble things that it must constitute 
eudaimonia as its central ingredient. If so, what we encounter is just a hedo-
nistic interpretation of Aristotle’s classical theory of pleasure, which resembles 
the hedonism criticized by Alexander.
This assumption can be further buttressed by another of Alexander’s texts, 
namely a treatise in the collection Mantissa with the title ‘From [the teachings 
of] Aristotle concerning the first appropriate thing’ (Mantissa §17, 150–153).64 
Although there have been several studies of this text, most of them center on 
the Stoic elements in the Peripatetic arguments,65 whereas none of them at-
taches due weight to the philosophical importance of the intra-school debates 
over the nature of pleasure implied here. In fact, just as in the PE, Alexander 
also takes this opportunity to attack hedonism in the Mantissa. Yet, unlike in 
the former case in which Alexander’s opponents remain anonymous, here 
the polemic is unambiguously directed at the hedonists who defend their atti-
tude by appealing to Aristotelian doctrines.66 Alexander reports the first group 
as follows:
Others say that, according to Aristotle (κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη), the primary 
object of attachment (τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον) is pleasure; they too are inspired 
(κινούμενοι) by what he says in the Nicomachean Ethics. For he says that 
64   I follow the suggestion of Sharples 2004, 149 n. 507. Different translations of the title Τῶν 
παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ τοῦ πρώτου οἰκείου are ‘The Views of the Aristotelians about the 
Primary Object of Attachment’ (Inwood 2014, 118), ‘[Selections] from Aristotle concerning 
the first appropriate thing’ (Falcon 2012, 142); ‘From the Aristotelian tradition concerning 
the first appropriate thing’ (Sharples 2004, 149; 2008, 206). It is important to see that the 
phrase παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους is ambiguous: it can refer to the views derived from Aristotle, or 
those found in Aristotle. For a discussion of this phrase, see Falcon 2012, 47–8.
65   Cf. Philippson 1932, 460–4; Striker 1997, 282–4; Sharples 2004. 149–59; 2010, 152–4; Falcon 
2012, 145–57; Inwood 2014, 118–25.
66   At the beginning of this treatise, the followers of Epicurus (τοῖς δὲ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον 150.33) 
are mentioned, according to whom the primary object of attachment is pleasure (ἡδονὴ τὸ 
πρῶτον οἰκεῖον, 150.33). Alexander, however, does not return to Epicurus and his followers, 
but only addresses two different kinds of hedonistic arguments that are mainly based on 
Aristotle’s theories (151.11–27). Although the ‘Aristotelian’ hedonists seem to agree with 
Epicurus in believing that pleasure is the first natural attachment, they do not think that 
pleasure is differentiated into two kinds: kinetic and katastematic (=freedom from pain) 
(cf. 150.34). Alexander’s move from the Epicureans to the Aristotelian hedonists corre-
sponds to, and is in parallel with, his shift from the Stoics (150.28–33) to the Stoicized 
Peripatetics Xenarchus and Boethus (151.3–11) in the same treatise. As in the PE, the main 
interest of this treatise is the intra-school debates, although the question itself—what is 
the primary object of attachment—manifests a Stoic influence.
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there are three objects of desire (τὰ ὀρεκτά): the fine (τὸ καλόν), the advan-
tageous, and the pleasant. And an object of desire is something to which 
we have an attachment (οἰκειώμεθα). But we come to grasp the noble and 
the advantageous as we get older, but we grasp the pleasant immediately 
(εὐθύς). So if these are the only objects of desire and attachment, and if 
the first of these is the pleasant, then this would be the primary object of 
attachment.
Mant. 151.18–2467
In this passage, some Aristotelians attempt to justify their hedonism by arguing 
that pleasure is the primary object of desire, the ultimate end of life. This argu-
mentative strategy is obviously influenced by the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis, yet, 
as a philosophical fashion since Hellenistic times, the use of this concept is by 
no means limited to Stoicism but spread widely among different philosophical 
schools.68 In the so-called divisio Carneadea,69 for instance, different attitudes 
towards three natural objects of desire—pleasure, freedom from pain, and the 
primary natural object (prima naturalia)—function as a guideline for classify-
ing ethical theories.70 Of nine different views on the ultimate good listed, the 
Peripatetics have diverged from each other, holding at least four different posi-
tions.71 A pleasure-friendly view is espoused by Calliphon and Deinomachus,72 
who argue that the highest good is a combination of virtues with pleasure, 
whereas the others opt for the freedom from pain (Hieronymus), the combi-
nation of virtue with freedom from pain (Diodorus), and the primary natural 
object (anonymous). Although the details of the reasons for their divergence 
cannot be restored, the intellectual milieu has sufficiently manifested the flex-
ibility and multiplicity of the Peripatetic tradition.
In accordance with the para-Stoic tendency, the Aristotelian ‘hedonists’ 
in Mantissa 151.18–24 follow the same tactic in their attempt to verify the pri-
macy of pleasure by demonstrating it to be the primary object of desire, yet 
it is uncertain whether their purpose, as with Calliphon and Deinomachus, 
was to make pleasure and virtue compatible by integrating both into a uni-
fying concept of the ultimate end, or whether they go further, drawing out a 
more ambitious hedonistic consequence. It is of course dubious how far these 
Aristotelians can be taken as ‘loyal’ to Aristotle. For in their arguments, not 
67   Trans. by Inwood (2014), modified.
68   Cf. Trapp 2007, n. 43, with references.
69   For this table see Algra 1997; Leonhardt 1999, 135–212; Annas 2007.
70   It is reported by Antiochus through Piso in Cicero’s de Fin. v 16–21.
71   According to Cicero, three of them are only theoretical possibilities, held by nobody.
72   Wehrli et al. 2004, 629; White 2002, 90.
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only are the Aristotelian terms haireta (Top. 118b28; 105a 27) and haireseis 
(EN 1104b30) replaced by the Stoic term orekta,73 but the hedonistic argument 
based on taking pleasure as the direct (euthus) attachment also echoes the clas-
sical Stoic strategy in their explanation of the significance of self-preservation 
as rooted in the primary oikeiōsis.74 In spite of being tinged by Stoic vocabulary 
and conception, it is Aristotle who is explicitly invoked by the ‘hedonists’ as 
their authority, perhaps not only his classification of the good into the fine, 
the advantageous, and the pleasant,75 but also his ranking of different kinds 
of ends in EN I. 7–8. It is remarkable that Aristotle claims on one occasion 
that the good is something of our own (oikeion ti) and hard to take from us 
(EN 1095b25–27), and he also praises Eudoxus’ argument in favor of pleasure 
as something divine (EN 1101b27–31). Those ‘hedonists’ seem to read such scat-
tered evidence through the prism of Stoicism, fashioning it into a coherent 
argument in favor of their pleasure-friendly position. Perhaps it is for this 
reason that Alexander underlines their approach as inspired (κινούμενοι) by 
Aristotle, which may insinuate some sort of reservation.
This hedonistic argument is not the only ‘Aristotelian’ argument for hedo-
nism in Alexander’s report. More revealingly, he goes on to discuss another 
hedonistic argument, which is obviously based on more solid evidence in 
Aristotle (his account of pleasure in EN VII and X) than his tripartition of the 
ends adduced by the first group, in which the nature of pleasure does not take 
pride of place:
Verginius Rufus and before him Sosicrates said that each person desires 
perfection (ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς τελειότητος), i.e., being in activity (τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ 
εἶναι), obviously being active with no impediment (ἀνεμποδίστως). That is 
why he says that for us too being in activity is desirable, and this is being 
alive and the activities dependent on life, which are pleasant. For this 
kind of natural activity is, as long as it is unimpeded, pleasant. But for 
each thing its perfection is a good. […] By desiring to be in activity, one 
would desire one’s own proper perfection. And this is a good for each, so 
that we desire it. It is consistent for those who postulate that the primary 
object of attachment (πρῶτον οἰκεῖον) is being and living in activity to 
73   Cf. ἡ ὄρεξις in the pseudo-Aristotle’s Divisiones 46.
74   Cf. οἰκειούμεθα πρὸς αὑτοὺς εὐθὺς γενόμενοι, Chrysippus SVF III.179; Hierocles: τὸ ζῶιον 
εὐθὺς ἅμα τῶι γενέσθαι αἰσθάνεται ἑαυτοῦ, col. 1.38; εὐθὺς ὠικειώθη πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ 
σύστασιν, col. 6.51–53; cf. 5.52, 6.7–8, 6.42–43.
75   Top. 118b28; 105a27; EN 1104b31, 1105a1; cf. SE 102b16–18, [Div.] 46. It is remarkable that 
this classification of the good is also admitted by Alexander himself, see Fat.15.185.21–28, 
Mant. 174.17–24. Cf. Sharples 2004, 155 n. 526.
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say that the primary object of attachment and the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) is 
pleasure.
Mant. 151.30–152.1, 3–6
At stake is obviously a hybrid account of Aristotle’s understanding of plea-
sure. It is hybrid, not only because these hedonists,76 like the first group 
of Aristotelians, align the Stoic discourse on the proper object of desire 
with Aristotle’s theories, but also because they blend Aristotle’s accounts in 
EN VII and X into a coherent foundation for their hedonistic view. Pleasure as 
a perfection is the key lesson from EN X, whereas the association of pleasure 
with an unimpeded activity apparently stems from EN VII. By identifying the 
unimpeded activity with the perfection (teleiotēs) of the nature of a subject, 
these hedonists establish a close link between pleasure, goodness, and activity. 
Just like Alexander, they are not puzzled by the supervenience relation in EN X, 
but are content with the vague affinity between pleasure and activity; it is thus 
also unclear in what sense pleasure and activity are identical with or different 
from each other. It is presumably in part for this reason that they have enough 
wiggle room to accommodate the accounts of both EN VII and X. In any case, 
it is not inconsistent if they, on the one hand, speak of the unimpeded ener-
geia in EN VII, and on the other argue for hedonism by drafting the theory of 
EN X as an ally when necessary. Although Alexander is unsatisfied with their 
hedonistic implication, their treatment of Aristotle’s two accounts of pleasure 
is irreproachable insofar as it fits well into the way Aspasius, Alexander, and 
other ancient commentators combine the two books of Aristotle in their com-
patibilist readings.
4 Alexander Reconsidered
Alexander’s criticism of the hedonists in the Mantissa appears less decisive 
than that in the PE. Either he has not found a proper way to meet the challenge 
from the Aristotelian hedonists (if this treatise was written earlier), or the Stoic 
framework of Mantissa §17 seems to constrain his argument, so that he cannot 
76   It is not clear whether or in what sense Verginius Rufus and Sosicrates belong to the 
Peripatos. Verginius Rufus might be the consul of 63 AD who was the guardian of the 
younger Pliny. Sosicrates, according to Lautner (1997: 304–305), might either be Sosicrates 
from Rhodes, the author of Successions (διατριβῶν) in DL 2.84, 6.80 and 7.163 or a student 
of Carneades mentioned in Philiodemus’ Index Academicocum XXIV. 8. The former can 
be Peripatetic, while the latter might be an Academic. cf. Sharples 2004, 155 n.527; Falcon 
2012, 155.
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develop his criticism at length by providing his more ‘authentic’ interpreta-
tion of Aristotle. In the Mantissa, he launches his attack on the Aristotelians 
from a ‘Stoic’ point of view, namely by disclosing their failure to grasp what the 
end actually is. He finds fault with the first group of hedonists in that they do 
not distinguish between two kinds of ends, confusing goodness for someone 
with goodness without qualification (Mant. 151.27–29). After that, he applies a 
similar criticism to the second group, pointing out that they do not distinguish 
between the apparent good (= pleasure) and the true good (cf. 152.20–35). It is 
unexpected, however, that Alexander seems hesitant about whether this argu-
ment is sufficient to refute the second group of hedonists, perhaps because 
they appear to be able to gain more support from Aristotle’s official account 
of pleasure. So he abruptly withdraws his criticism at 152.35, and turns to 
another convoluted argument (152.35–153.27), the gist of which is unfortunate-
ly difficult to tease out. No matter how we assess this elusive shift, what is more 
significant for our purposes is to note that Alexander’s ‘new’ argument seems 
to be an embryonic form of his central anti-hedonistic strategy in the PE.
One has not made pleasure the goal of one’s appetition (σκοπὸν τῆς 
ὀρέξεως), but has this as accompanying (ἑπομένην) the activity. For every-
thing which is in accordance with nature is pleasant. It is not the case 
that, having first enjoyed pleasure, one then on this basis has appetition 
for that through which he enjoyed pleasure.
Mant. 153.14–1777
Alexander distinguishes between the proper end and something that accom-
panies the end, that is equivalent to a distinction between the energeia as the 
end and pleasure as its concomitant. Based on this distinction, he replies to 
the hedonists that although all activities are pleasant if they are in accordance 
with nature, that does not mean that pleasure is thereby the reason or the end 
of one’s appetite, because pleasure is only a concomitant of the activity. This 
argument, despite still being in a ‘para-Stoic’ fashion, accords in principle with 
the argument in the PE based on the supervenience-relation between pleasure 
and activity.
In any case, Alexander’s debate with the hedonists (especially with the sec-
ond group in Mant. §17) seems to foreshadow the conflict between Alexander 
and the anonymous anti-hedonists in the PE. The hedonists in the Mantissa 
(Verginius Rufus and Sosicrates) and the hedonists in the PE are in agreement 
that they champion the intrinsic connection of pleasure and activity based on 
77   Trans. by Sharples 2004, my italics.
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their reading of Aristotle. If we recall the aforementioned distinction between 
the Extrinsic and Intrinsic Readings of the Aristotelian definition of pleasure 
in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship, then the debate between Alexander 
and the Aristotelian hedonists foreshadows the classical debate over Aristotle’s 
pleasure as supervenience in contemporary academia. According to the hedo-
nistic Aristotelians, the intrinsic relation between pleasure and activity means 
that as long as an activity is perfect, pleasure occurs naturally as integral to 
this activity, sharing its central properties. For Alexander, however, the link 
between activity and pleasure is external. Alexander underlines how the value 
of pleasure is determined by that of its corresponding activity, and ignores the 
reciprocal contribution of pleasure to the activity in question. He also empha-
sizes how pleasure can emerge indiscriminately from all kinds of activities, 
and is no more intimately bound up with the activity if it is unimpeded or in 
an excellent condition.
The discrepancy between Alexander and the ‘hedonists’ also extends to 
pain. Admittedly, both agree that pleasure is opposed to pain, and both use the 
mirroring method, trying to infer the properties of pain from its opposite plea-
sure. Nonetheless their findings are quite distinct. For the ‘hedonists,’ pain is 
connected with the incompleteness of activity, so that as long as an activity is 
bad, the corresponding pain occurs naturally. This also explains why shameful 
activity is not desirable. In this sense, pleasure and pain indicate respectively 
the properties of the activity they accompany as differentiating signs. By con-
trast, Alexander points out emphatically that ‘pleasures supervene no less on 
shameful activities [than on noble ones]’ (PE 145.20–21),78 which shows that, 
in his view, pleasure is neither immanent in perfect activities nor does it (even 
partly) constitute these activities. Accordingly, there is no intrinsic relation be-
tween pain and bad activities.
Alexander argues against both the intrinsic connection between pleasure 
and good activity and the causal contribution of pleasure to activity, because 
he believes that these relationships pave the path towards hedonism, a view 
from which any true Aristotelian should distance himself.
For it is not possible to say that nobility and pleasure are the same thing 
in the cases where they co-exist and exist at the same time as each other. 
For if their essence were the same, it would be necessary for them to be 
convertible with each other, so that everything that was noble would, in 
78   τῷ μηδὲν ἔλαττον […] τὰς ἡδονὰς γινομένας ἐπ’ αἰσχραῖς ἐνεργείαις.
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being noble, also possess the quality of being pleasant, and everything 
that was pleasant would simultaneously be both pleasant and noble.
PE 145.14–1879
In his view, the foundation of this hedonism is fragile because the hedonist 
point of view boils down to a dilemma from an Aristotelian point of view:
Either one must deny that certain pleasures supervene also on shameful 
actions, [saying that they supervene] only on noble ones; or else what 
is shameful will truly deserve to be chosen in the same way as what is 
noble, if it is the pleasure that they produce that is the cause of their 
being chosen.
PE 145.5–880
The aporia Alexander raises is that either they think that pleasure supervenes 
only on noble activities, or that they must permit that shameful activities are 
also worth choosing. If they choose the first alternative, Alexander would 
object that this does not square with common sense; if they opt for the latter, 
they would fall into self-contradiction because they also explicitly reject the 
pursuit of shameful activity, albeit for different reasons (PE 145.31–33). Under 
meticulous scrutiny, however, the doctrine of these hedonists is not unable to 
meet Alexander’s challenge.
In the debate with the hedonists, the criterion used by Alexander to dis-
tinguish between different kinds of activity is no doubt ethically oriented. So 
instead of predications of good and bad, he more frequently talks of noble 
(kalon) and shameful (aischron) activity.81 By contrast, although what is deter-
mined as the perfect activity in Aristotle is not independent of ethical conno-
tation, the key aspect is predominantly functional in a broader sense. A perfect 
activity, according to Aristotle, is one in which the subject, its object, and their 
relation are all in an excellent state for carrying out their functions.82 Since 
both animals and the gods are included in Aristotle’s account of pleasure, it 
79   οὐ γὰρ δὴ ταὐτὸν οἷόν τε λέγειν εἶναι τὸ καλόν τε καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐφ’ ὧν συνυπάρχει τε καὶ ἅμα 
ἐστὶν ἀλλήλοις. εἰ γὰρ εἴη ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἀντιστρέφειν αὐτὰ ἀλλήλοις ἀνάγκη, ὡς πᾶν 
τὸ καλὸν ἐν τῷ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ εἶναι ἔχειν καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἡδὺ ἅμα τε ἡδὺ εἶναι καὶ καλόν.
80   ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ λέγειν γίνεσθαί τινας καὶ ἐπ’ αἰσχραῖς πράξεσιν ἡδονάς, ἀλλ’ ἐπ μόναις ταῖς καλαῖς, 
ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀληθῶς αἱρετὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὁμοίως τῷ καλῷ, εἰ ἡ γινομένη ὑπ’ αὐτῶν 
ἡδονὴ τῆς αἱρέσεως αὐτῶν αἰτία.
81   PE 127.16–18; 134. 20–22, 25–27; 138.10–11, 14–28; 139.3–14; 144.10–17; 144.33–145.11; 145.18–21, 
23–24; 28–34; 146.1–7; 12–13.
82   EN X.4.1174b14–23; 28–31.
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definitely demonstrates that the values in question are beyond moral good and 
evil.83 If we bear this aspect in mind, the hedonists are in fact not so help-
less when confronted with the dilemma raised by Alexander. To be sure, they 
will not deny the empirical fact that pleasures are present not merely in noble 
activities but also in shameful ones. But they can doubt that this is what is 
meant by the so-called noble activity upon which pleasure supervenes. If the 
claim that pleasure supervenes merely upon the noble activity means that 
pure pleasures, namely the pleasures which are not mixed with any pain, must 
supervene upon the perfect activity and constitute this activity, the hedo-
nists are willing to embrace this opinion without hesitation. And obviously, 
this kind of pleasure could not accompany shameful actions. But if the noble 
activity is understood in an ethical sense, they would reply that what they are 
chiefly concerned with is not limited to morality, but the overall function of a 
living organism or its part.
As we have seen, Alexander understands the supervenience relation between 
pleasure and activity as pleasure’s being somehow a part of the activity or its 
end.84 But, presumably in order to avoid any hedonistic implication to which 
such characterizations might lead, he does not address these options again. In 
fact, his final doctrine is not even compatible with them. For it is inconceivable 
that pleasure, if it is a part or an end of an activity, is causally inert. Although 
Alexander bases his anti-hedonistic argument on Aristotle’s official doctrine 
that pleasure supervenes upon activity, his epiphenomenalist reading of this 
theory renders him closer to Stoicism than he would be willing to acknowl-
edge. For the classical anti-hedonistic strategy used by the Stoics, as Diogenes 
Laertius tells us, is to argue that pleasure is not the primary attachment, but 
a by-product (epigennēma),85 a term derived from the verb epigignetai used 
by Aristotle for the so-called supervenience relation (cf. EN X 1174b33). It is 
thus conceivable that although Alexander purports to provide a faithful inter-
pretation of Aristotle, his account would not persuade all of the Aristotelians, 
in particular those who are inclined to set up a close link between Aristotle 
and the hedonistic tradition. Theoretically considered, at least four elements 
in Alexander would be controversial. (1) The supervenience relation between 
83   Cf. EN VII.1.1145a25–27; 12.1153a30–31; b25–32; 14.1154b25–28; X.2.1173a1–5; 5.1176a5–9; 
7.1177a23–24.
84   PE 127.10–13.
85   DL 7.86: ἐπιγέννημα γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν, ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἡ φύσις 
ἐπιζητήσασα τὰ ἐναρμόζοντα τῇ συστάσει ἀπολάβῃ. ὃν τρόπον ἀφιλαρύνεται τὰ ζῷα καὶ θάλλει 
τὰ φυτά. Cf. the anti-hedonistic argument of Cleanthes in SVF III 155. For a more sophis-
ticated interpretation of the Stoic understanding of pleasure as epigennēma, in particular 
in Seneca, see McVane in this volume.
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pleasure and activity is evenly distributed in the sense that the supervenience 
of pleasure upon an excellent energeia does not enjoy any privilege in com-
parison with the supervenience of pleasure upon the energeiai that are bad 
or neutral. (2) Although good pleasure must derive from a good energeia, it is 
not conversely warranted that a good energeia must intrinsically entail a corre-
sponding pleasure. (3) Pleasure and pain do not have any independent causal 
effect. (4) Since every concrete pleasure and pain obtains its evaluation respec-
tively from the activities accompanied by them in opposed ways, the value of 
pleasure and pain as a whole is indeterminate.86
How would the other Aristotelians object to these theses? If Alexander 
accuses them of degenerating into Epicureanism, they could counter him 
by questioning whether his proposal dresses Aristotle up as a Stoic sage. No 
doubt, they must agree with Alexander that pleasure as a whole can be good 
or bad. But this does not mean that pleasure by its very nature is axiologically 
indeterminate. On the contrary, they would reply, one of Aristotle’s primary 
concerns in his two accounts of pleasure is to defend the positive value of 
pleasure as such by appeal to the affinity between pleasure and good activity. 
Pleasure, in short, does not only necessarily supervene on a good activity, if 
there is no external hindrance, but also as its perfection causally completes this 
activity.87 For this reason, pleasure is for them good, even if not all pleasures 
are good.
To understand why Alexander’s interpretation is in tension with Aristotle’s 
account, it may be useful to take a glimpse at the debate between Aristotle 
and Eudoxus over the argument from pleasure as an additional good. 
Eudoxus argues that pleasure is the ultimate good because if pleasure is 
added to (prostithemenēn) something, it makes this thing more valuable 
(EN X.2.1172b23–34). A full explication of this argument and Aristotle’s reply 
is beyond the scope of my survey. But if we pay attention to the subtle diver-
gence between Aristotle and Eudoxus in their debate, we might better grasp 
why some Aristotelians would reject Alexander’s extrinsic reading of pleasure. 
Aristotle’s diagnosis of this argument is intriguing. He does not dismiss the 
phenomenon [claim?] that the addition of pleasure makes other things better, 
nor does he seem to be bothered by any hedonistic conclusion to be drawn 
from this premise. On the contrary, he complains that this argument is not 
‘hedonistic’ enough in the sense that it cannot fulfill Eudoxus’ initial purpose, 
86   Although Alexander does not thus evaluate pleasure and pain as indifferent, his position 
is very close to this Stoic classification of pleasure and pain. Cf. Stobaeus II. 5a; 7b.
87   EN 1174b22: τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή, cf. 1174b24, b31–32, 1175a15, a17, a21, a28, a30, 
1176a26–29.
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namely to prove that pleasure is the good or the best thing. For the most we 
can draw from the ability of pleasure to increase any other thing’s good is a 
moderate thesis: i.e., pleasure is a good thing (EN X.2.1172b26–32). This diag-
nosis helps us better understand why Aristotle introduces supervenience to 
re-determine the relation between pleasure and activity. The intention of his 
proposal is actually to render their relation more intimate, which aims to show 
that pleasure, in the strict sense, is the good, by connecting and assimilating 
pleasure with perfect activity.88
To conclude then, I suggest that Alexander’s approach in the PE is consider-
ably determined by his intention to resist the hedonistic implication his oppo-
nents draw from Aristotle’s account of pleasure. The main target of Alexander’s 
anti-hedonistic arguments is those who adopted a hedonistic reading of 
Aristotle’s accounts of pleasure. To refute them, Alexander is forced to under-
rate the normative structure implied in the supervenience between pleasure 
and good activity, so that it is understandable that he denies any intrinsic link 
between pleasure and goodness. The cost of his reading is that pleasure, as 
something that is neither good nor bad in its own right, is deprived of any 
causal effect or normative standing. A merit is that this proposal can well 
explain why pleasures differ in kind according to Aristotle (EN 1173b28). In 
addition, it allows the positive evaluation of some pains, so that the Peripatetic 
demand of moderate emotions is kept consistent with Aristotle’s doctrines 
about pleasure and pain. Moreover, it leads him to take the problem of pain 
more seriously than any other commentators on Aristotle. For although the 
neutralization of pain can accommodate an influential pain-friendly tradition, 
i.e., a tradition in which pain was taken as constitutive of the path to happi-
ness, it seems at odds with Aristotle’s use of the premise that pain is something 
bad in many dialectical arguments. To address this aporia, Alexander attempts 
to classify different kinds of pains, trying to figure out a way to explain in 
what sense Aristotle can take pain as bad even if there are pains which are 
good or neutral.
88   Alexander does not mention Eudoxus explicitly in the whole text of the Ethica Problemta. 
From his frequent quotations of the argument from contraries (Pr. §6, §7, §17), how-
ever, it is clear that he knows the Eudoxean arguments supporting hedonism very well 
(cf. Sharples 1990a, 31, n73). Unfortunately, he fails to notice the significance of the debate 
between Eudoxus and Aristotle over the argument from pleasure as an additional good. 
Otherwise he would have endeavored to distance his own concept of supervenience from 
Eudoxus’ thesis in which pleasure functions as an additional good.
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